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RIEB, Kobe University Site Map Access 日本語 Home Research & Education Publications RIEB Discussion Paper Series (English) RIEB Discussion Paper Series No.2013-20 RIEB Discussion Paper Series No.2013-20 Title A Formal Theory of Firm Boundaries: A Trade-Off between Rent Seeking and Bargaining Costs Abstract We develop a theory of firm boundaries in the spirit of transaction cost analysis, in which trading parties engage in ex post value split. We show that ex post inefficient bargaining under non-integration creates a trade-off between rent seeking and bargaining costs: while non-integration incurs lower rent-seeking costs than integration, it suffers from bargaining delay and breakdown, which never occur under integration. This result explains why rent-seeking activities within firms are likely to be more costly than those between firms, and offers a formal justification for the "costs of bureaucracy" in Williamson (1985). Keywords JEL Classification --> Inquiries Yusuke MORIResearch Fellow of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, JAPAN About RIEB Faculty Seminars at RIEB Research & Education Sections Kobe University Site Policy Site Map Access Contact Us Copyright©1996-2018 Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University. All Rights Reserved.