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RIEB, Kobe University Site Map Access 日本語 Home Research & Education Publications RIEB Discussion Paper Series (English) RIEB Discussion Paper Series No.2016-17 RIEB Discussion Paper Series No.2016-17 Title Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets Abstract This paper investigates the interaction between firms' information acquisition decisions and disclosure of internally acquired information in a Cournot duopoly market. The results are as follows. Given that the precision of firms' private information is constant, mandatory disclosure of information about the industry-wide demand uncertainty can enhance social welfare. However, when the precision of firms' private information is endogenously determined, mandatory disclosure is not always desirable. This is because when disclosure is mandated, firms acquire less precise information compared to the case where acquired information is not disclosed, and hence their internal information environments are deteriorated. This can lead to "unintended consequences," such that disclosure regulation strictly decreases social welfare on the whole. Keywords Information acquisition, Disclosure, Duopoly, Social welfare JEL Classification L13, M41, M48 Inquiries Kazunori MIWA Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe 657-8501 Japan Phone: +81-78-803-7036 FAX: +81-78-803-7059 About RIEB Faculty Seminars at RIEB Research & Education Sections Kobe University Site Policy Site Map Access Contact Us Copyright©1996-2018 Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University. All Rights Reserved.